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In our federal system, there is a constant tension regarding the power
and authority of state courts via a via federal courts. In this article, the
author discusses the Importance of adequate and Independent state
grounds as rules of decision. Specifically, the author considers the
disposition by the United States Supreme Court of state cases which
grant relief under tederal law and the ability of state courts to reinstate
their judgments upon adequate and Independent state grounds.

THE ADEQUATE AND
INDEPENDENT STATE GROUND:
SOME PRACTICAL
CONSIDERATIONS*
Honorable Samuel J. Roberts"*
Thank you for the honor of the invitation to join you this evening. I
must say that after more than 30 years in the arena of constant controversies, I am delighted to be at this center of learning, and have greatly enjoyed this academic atmosphere of scholarly peace.
Perhaps the most significant development in federal-state relations
over the last decade has been state court reliance on "adequate and independent state grounds" for decision in cases which twenty years ago probably would have been decided under federal constitutional law instead.
The state grounds used have, of course, included not only state constitutional law but also state statutory and common law, the latter of which has
enormous potential because of its inherent flexibility, and has virtually no
federal counterpart.
Just a little over a decade ago, there were only a handful of jurisdictions-California, Pennsylvania, New York, and Hawaii-which had
$
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utilized an "adequate and independent state ground." Wyoming deserves
at least an honorable mention for being aheadof that handful: Back in 1950,
the Wyoming Supreme Court held that women have the same right to serve
on juries as do men, in part because your state was the first state to grant
women the right to vote.' The Supreme Court of the United States did not
2
reach the same conclusion until 1975, twenty-five years later.
Today, all jurisdictions have utilized the adequate and independent
state ground. In some jurisdictions the reliance on state law has been
limited to granting counsel to an indigent on a discretionary appeal, thus
providing more relief under state law than is required by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Ross v. Moffitt.3 In other jurisdictions, state
law has been relied upon in a wide variety of contexts; for example, the
a
Wyoming Supreme Court has relied on state grounds in cases involving
5
less-than-unanimous jury, 4 and in the area of public school financing. In
some instances, state courts have relied on state law in cases on remand
from the Supreme Court of the United States to reinstate their previous
judgments granting relief.
Why has the use of the adequate and independent state ground become
so popular among state courts in recent years? From the standpoint of
operating a state court system, there are several practical reasons for using state grounds as a basis for decision. Traditionally, such a state-law based decision is neither reviewable nor reversible by the Supreme Court of
the United States, provided of course that the state ground is at least coextensive with, or broader than, any similar federal right. More important,
however, the use of state grounds, where appropriate, lends stability, integrity, and finality to state court decisions, and thus makes for a better
state court system-a system governed, controlled, and supervised by state
court adjudications, for state judges, practitioners, and litigants. And, to
the extent that state court adjudications are properly rested exclusively on
state-law grounds, the burden of our federal courts is reduced.
The adequate and independent state ground also improves the efficiency and effectiveness of a state court system by avoiding the impact of
future changes in Supreme Court decisional law. Especially in areas where
the case law of the United States Supreme Court is somewhat unsettled or
is in transition, there is all the more reason for state courts to utilize state6
law grounds for their decisions. For example, in Commonwealth v. Story
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the federal harmless error standard of Chapman v. California7 as a state standard, and in Commonwealth
v. Wares the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the federal rule of
Johnson v. New Jersey9 concerning the effective date of Miranda as a
1. State v. Yazzie, 67 Wyo. 256, 218 P.2d 482 (1950).
2. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
3. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
4. Taylor v. State, 612 P.2d 851 (Wyo. 1980).
5. Washakie County School District v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
6. 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978).
7. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
8. 446 Pa. 52, 284 A.2d 700 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 987 (1972), cert. vacated and
denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972) ("Certiorari denied, it appearing that the judgment below
rests upon an adequate state ground.")
9. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
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matter of state law. The result is that these state court decisions will not be
affected by a subsequent narrowing of federal decisional law. They will be
affected only if the United States Supreme Court expands these federal
constitutional rights.
The articulation of a state ground for decision used to be a relatively
easy task. For example, in Commonwealth v. Platou the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court simply said in a footnote, "[o]ur discussion of the Fourth
Amendment is equally applicable to the state constitutional provision." 10
The Commonwealth's petition for a writ of certiorari was denied with the
Supreme Court noting that "it appear[s] that the judgment below rests
upon an adequate state ground."" Now, however, as a result of Michigan
v. Long,' 2 where a state court intends to rest a decision on state law, the
state court in its opinion must clearly and specifically articulate that its
decision is based exclusively on state law, and must disclaim even the citation to analogous federal cases.
In Long, the state court's opinion states expressly that relief was required under both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
and article 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution. Should not the state
court's reliance on a specific state constitutional provision be a sufficiently
clear indication of the state court's intent to rest its decision on state law?
Certainly if the standard utilized in Platou had been utilized in Long, the
Supreme Court would have assumed that the decision was controlled by
state law. In any event, it would appear that a state court of last resort
could, by decision or rule, mandate that all cases in its courts rest on state
law grounds unless specified otherwise-in effect, reverse the presumption
of Michigan v. Long.
Should the Supreme Court take cases such as Michigan v. Long in the
first instance? It was not until the Judiciary Act of 1914 that Congress gave
the Court authority to review state court judgments granting relief under
10. 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29, 31 n.2 (1973).
11. 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
12. 103 S.Ct. 3469 (1983). Police officers conducted a warrantless search of the defendant's
vehicle while investigating a one-car accident. The search yielded marijuana and the
defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that a Terry v. Ohio pat-down is
limited to the defendant's person. The prosecutor argued that a Terry pat-down of the
defendant was justified by the presence of a knife in the car and that the further search of
the car fell within the scope of the protective purpose of Terry.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conviction. However, the
Michigan Supreme Court reversed the conviction, stating that the "search of the vehicle
was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 1, §
11 of the Michigan Constitution." People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 320 N.W.2d 866, 870
(1982).
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the ground that the
Michigan Supreme Court had misinterpreted Terry. In presuming that the state ground
alluded to by the Michigan Supreme Court was not independent, the Court stated:
[l]t fairly appears in this case that the Michigan Supreme Court rested its decision primarily on federal law.
Rather than dismissing the case, or requiring that the state court reconsider its decision on our behalf solely because of a mere possibility that an adequate and independent ground supports the judgment, we find that we have
jurisdiction in the absence of a plain statement that the decision below rested
on an adequate and independent state ground.
Michigan v. Long, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3477-78 (1978) (emphasis added).
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federal law. Before 1914, the Court could consider only those cases in
which a state court rejected a federal constitutional claim.
In Stone v. Powell, decided in 1976, the Supreme Court held that, so
long as a prisoner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his unsuccessful
fourth amendment claim in the state courts, the federal district court on
habeas corpus is not to interfere with his conviction even if the state court
has decided the fourth amendment claim erroneously.' 5 If the federal
district courts under Stone v. Powell are not to disturb erroneous state
court denials of relief, should the Supreme Court entertain requests for
review in cases where relief has been granted? The Act of 1914 merely
authorizes-it does not direct or require the Court to take cases like
Michigan v. Long.
As a practical matter, if a state court decision provides greater protection under federal law than the federal constitution requires, and the decision is set aside by the United States Supreme Court, the original state
decision may nevertheless be reinstated on an independent state ground.
The most recent example is Washington v. Chrisman, in which the
Supreme Court decided that the Washington Supreme Court erroneously
granted relief under federal law, but the Washington Supreme Court on remand simply reinstated its judgment as a matter of state law. 1'
Surely the United States Supreme Court's huge workload would be
reduced if the Court did not review state court decisions granting relief
under federal law. In the 1982-83 Term alone, eleven of the Court's 152
signed opinions involved cases such as Michigan v. Long, in which the
15
Supreme Court set aside a state court's grant of relief under federal law.
13. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
14. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 1982), judgment reinstatedon remand, 676 P.2d 419
(Wash. 1984) (search and seizure invalid under state constitution). See also South Dakota
v. Neville, 103 S.Ct. 916 (1983), judgment reinstatedon remand, 35 Crim. L. Rptr. 2021
(S.D. Jan. 14, 1984) (evidence of refusal to submit to drunk-driving tests suppressed as
violation of state due process clause).
Other examples of state courts granting relief on remand: South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (Fourth Amendment), judgment reinstatedon remand, 247 N.W.2d
673 (S.D. 1976) (relief granted under state constitution); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1975) (Miranda), relief granted on another ground on remand, 400 Mich. 181, 254
N.W.2d 29 (1977); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (Terry pat-down relief
granted on another groundon remand, 477 Pa. 553, 385 A.2d 334 (1978). See also Pennsylvania v. Henderson, 446 U.S. 905 (1980) (remanded for further consideration in light
of Fare v. Michael C, 442 U.S. 707 (1978) (request for probation officer does not constitute invocation of Miranda rights)), judgment reinstatedon remand, 496 Pa. 349, 437
A.2d 387 (1981) (Pennsylvania "interested adult" rule has always been a matter of state
law).
15. State court criminal cases from 1982-83 in which a grant of relief under federal law was
set aside: Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S.Ct. 673 (1983) (double jeopardy); South Dakota v.
Neville, 103 S.Ct. 916 (1983) (self-incrimination); Texas v. Brown, 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983)
(fourth amendment); Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983) (fourth amendment); Illinois
v. Lafayette, 103 S.Ct. 2605 (1983) (fourth amendment); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S.Ct.
2830 (1983) (Miranda); Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S.Ct. 3319 (1983) (fourth amendment);
Califonia v. Ramos, 103 S.Ct. 3446 (1983) (death penalty); Michigan v. Long, 103 S.Ct.
3469 (1983) (fourth amendment). Similar non-criminal cases from 1982-83: White v.
Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, 103 S.Ct. 1042 (1983) (commerce clause
claim rejected); City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 103 S.Ct. 2979 (1983) (city
not required under federal law to pay for medical care provided to person injured while
being apprehended by police).
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(Six was the previous high and that was in the 1975-76 Term.) Moreover, in
previous years, the vast majority of cases in which state court judgments
were set aside were corrections of erroneous denials of relief, whereas in
1982-83 the majority of such cases were corrections of erroneous grants.
Of additional interest to state court systems is Colorado v. Nunez,
decided just last February. There, the Court unanimously agreed in a per
curiam order that it had erroneously issued a writ of certiorari to the Colorado Supreme Court, in light of the "adequate and independent ground"
for the state court's decision.16 Notwithstanding the dismissal of the writ of
certiorari (an indication of the Court's lack of jurisdiction to decide the
merits), three members of the Court proceeded to disclaim the result reached by the Colorado Supreme Court and to offer their views on why federal
law did not require the result reached by the state court as a matter of state
law.
What jurisprudential principle or aspect of federalism is advanced by
such an opinion? Does not good calendar control suggest that cases such as
Colorado v. Nunez and Michigan v. Long should be denied discretionary
review, so that already scarce and costly professional resources may be
more effectively utilized?
In an increasing number of cases, the Supreme Court's mandate to a
state court is a "reversal," without an accompanying remand to the state
court. I have always been intrigued by the Court s mandates, particularly
those issued to state courts. One especially interesting case is City ofPittsburgh v. Alco ParkingCorp., decided in 1973.11 There the Supreme Court's
opinion stated that the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
reversed, but no mention was made of a remand "for proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's opinion." (This is the mandate customarily
entered in cases where a state court judgment is disturbed; remands to the
federal courts are for "proceedings consistent.") Yet the official judgment
order in Alco Parking specifically directed a remand for proceedings "not
inconsistent" with the Court's opinion. Mandates of reversal on at least
four other occasions since 1972 have been so supplemented.' 8
A mandate of reversal without a remand leaves the impression that the
state court is without an opportunity to reinstate its judgment as a matter
of state law. Such a mandate was issued in Oregon v. Hass, 9 and it apparently dissuaded the Oregon Supreme Court from reinstating its earlier
decision. Similar mandates of reversal without a remand were issued three
times in the 1980-81 Term,20 twice in the 1982-83 Term, 2 ' and twice thus
16. 103 S.Ct. 1257 (1984).
17. 417 U.S. 369 (1974), reversing, 453 Pa. 245, 307 A.2d 851 (1973).
18. Mandates of reversal supplemented by remands: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (first amendment privilege rejected); Windward Shipping v. American Radio Ass'n., 415 U.S. 104 (1974) (preemption claim rejected);
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, 410 U.S. 356 (1973) (equal protection claim rejected); Evansville Airport v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972) (preemption claim
rejected).
19. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
20. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 446 (1981) (ban on use of plastic milk
cartons upheld); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (car search upheld); Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (detention incident to house search).
21. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983) Cformant's credibility); City of Revere v.
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 103 S.Ct. 2979 (1983) (city not required under federal law to
pay for medical care provided to person injured while being apprehended by police).
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far in the current Term. 22 It should be noted that in New York v. Belton, a
case decided in the 1980-81 Term, the New York Court of Appeals treated
the reversal as a remand, and proceeded to reach the same result reached
by the Supreme Court as a matter of state law.2" It should also be noted
that Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Ct., the Supreme Court began its opinion by announcing, "we reverse" 24 yet the Court ended its opinion by
and remanding for proceedings "not invacating the state court judgment
2
consistent" with the opinion. 6
In Herb v. Pitcairn,a case decided in 1945 which contains perhaps the
classic statement on the relationship between state courts and the Supreme
Court of the United States, Justice Jackson observed that the only power of
the Supreme Court over state court judgments
is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge
federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not
to revise opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state
review could
court after we corrected its view of federal laws, our
26
amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.
One hopes that the Court's more recent mandates of reversals without
remands may be nothing more than technical errors of a busy Court.
However, as was suggested by the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall in
Oregon v. Hass, these mandates may also indicate an attempt to "correct"
merely to the extent that
state court judgments in any respect, and not
27
federal rights have been incorrectly decided.
29
28
In light of the decisions in Coloradov. Nunez, and Michigan v. Long,
it may be expected that state courts will now, more than ever, utilize state
law grounds as bases for decision. In doing so, state courts will be seeking
all the help they can obtain from all components of the legal community. At
the same time, all elements of legal education must prepare to meet the
needs of state courts with appropriate professional responses, including,
for example, scrutiny of law school courses with an eye toward the ever
growing importance of state constitutions, state statutes, state regulations, and state rules of decision.

I am confident that all state court systems, with the able assistance of
fine law schools such as yours, will meet the challenges which face them. As
they do, we will all move ever closer to the fulfillment of James Madison's
vision of federalism, in which state and federal courts are "independent
tribunals of justice who will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of [individual] rights."3 0
22. Michigan v. Clifford, 104 S.Ct. 641 (1984) (fuel can discovered in plain view during postarson search should not have been excluded); Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (1984)
(statement to probation officer admissible).
23. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
24. 104 S.Ct. 819, 821 (1984).
25. Id. at 826.

26. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
27.
28.
29.
30.

420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying note 17.
See supra, text accompanying note 12.
W. Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 489, 504 (1977), quoting I. Annals of Congress 439.
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I thank you for your gracious hospitality, and for the kindness and
warmth which you have shown me throughout my visit.
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